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ABSTRACT

Within the United States, there is an observable phenomenon that for many
individuals Christianity and secularism are two incompatible and opposed rationalities.
However, there is currently no conclusive evidence to explain the resultant conflict
between religion and science. The current project aimed to establish causal relationships
between analytical thinking and religiosity and build an explanatory model with
defensiveness against secularism as the mediator for this association. Religious
individuals reject secularism because they see it as a threat to their religious belief, value
systems, and society at large. They perceive secularism as an abject rejection of those
religious values they hold as important, and as a result they consciously and
unconsciously resist cognitive strategies related to scientific reasoning. However, this
study did not find support for the previously established negative relationship between
analytic thinking and religiosity, even though Christians did find secularism to be a threat
to their beliefs. Instead, there appeared to be a disconnect in individuals’ construals of
their religiosity and secular reasoning. Further research is necessary to assess the
generalizability of previous claims of a robust, negative association between religiosity
and analytic thinking, and how dissonant cultural beliefs impact behavior.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the course of the United States’ history, religion and science have
seemingly been in a constant struggle as social institutions for the position of most
dominant cultural force. A recent Pew Research Center survey (2015) reported that 59%
of Americans generally believe that the two often conflict. A part of this conflict is born
from secularism, the separation of church or religious influences from the affairs of a
governing body. Secularism in this context finds its foundation in the First Amendment
of the United States’ Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof [..]” (U.S. Const.
amend. I.). Thus, the duality of secularism and religion has been at the core of the nation
from its start, with secularism eventually evolving to also capture the philosophies and
values of empiricism, science, and rationality as well (Calhoun, 2010). While secularism
and its associated tenets may be considered a relatively recent development in human
history in terms of its breadth and influence, religion has historically been central to the
function and lives of many humans and societies.
Religion is understood to give individuals a broad framework to explain the
world, a sense of meaning in life, methods of providing feelings of control over the
otherwise uncontrollable, comfort, intimacy with others and a transcendent force, and
managing transformative processes in in one’s life (Rusu & Turliuc, 2011). However, the
epistemological dispute that has arisen between the two cultural forces does not solely
arise from efforts to explain the physical world (i.e., science’s core motive), but partly
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from the assignment of meaning and morality to everyday life (i.e., religion’s core
motive) and the perception that one is encroaching upon the other’s central domain (Paul,
2005; Evans & Evans, 2008). However, there is currently no conclusive evidence to
explain the consequences of this perception of conflict between religion and science.
The Ideological Surround Model (ISM), suggests that religions and the sciences
operate as their own rationalities that are comprised of different standards which are
informed by cultural norms that are fundamentally irreconcilable (Watson, 2011). For
instance, the principles of empiricism necessitate that a purported phenomenon be
capable of being observed, tested and falsified; however, a belief in an ethereal deity who
cannot be perceived by any replicable, physical means cannot be held up to this standard
whatsoever. ISM offers that the two rationalities may not always be incompatible, but the
two are highly inclined to conflict with each other’s reasoning due to their immovable
standards (e.g., unwavering belief in a human being resurrected versus the observable
finality of organic death).
The effects of this cultural conflict are visible on an individual-level: a metaanalysis of 63 studies by Zuckerman, Silberman, and Hall (2013) demonstrated a
significant negative association between intelligence and religiosity in the United States,
which is partly explained by intelligent individuals’ reliance on an analytic thinking, as
opposed to intuitive, style. Analytical thinking is understood to be important for scientific
thinking and having positive attitudes towards science as it involves the careful
evaluation of information (Quitadamo & Kurtz, 2007; Siribunnam & Tayraukham, 2009).
Notably, there is cross-cultural evidence to suggest that this negative association is
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relatively unique to the United States. In historically highly religious societies, Iran
(Ghorbani, Watson, Chen, & Dover, 2013), Malaysia (Tekke, Watson, İsmail, & Chen,
2015), and India (Kamble, Watson, Marigoudar, & Chen, 2014), there are positive
associations between religiosity and being more open towards analytical thinking.
An initial suspicion might be that these findings are due to some unknown
consequence of Christian ideology, in particular on thinking style preference; however, a
pattern similar to the cross-cultural cases has been found in Armenian Orthodox
Christians (Watson, Ghorbani, Vartanian, & Chen, 2015). These studies suggest that the
positive associations of religiosity and secular-related thinking may be due to specific
values embedded in the respective regions’ cultural contexts (e.g., history of unified
religious and academic efforts), instead of some special quality of Christianity’s
ideology. Thus, to more fully understand the religious-secular cultural conflict that
appears to exist within the United States, it is crucial to assess those factors which
contribute to the negative relationship between analytical thinking and religiosity on an
individual level.
This project’s focus is on one of the most notable cultural factors that drives the
heart of the religious-secular conflict: the existence of an American Christian belief in a
cultural war of secularism aiming to eliminate Christianity from the United States and the
need to act in defiance of this perceived persecution. Watson, Chen, Morris, and
Stephenson (2015) operationalized this as “defense against secularism” and found that
psychological defensiveness partially explains the negative relationships between analytic
thinking and open-mindedness with religiosity. Conservative Christians strongly aligned
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with this framework of belief and cultural resistance due to the relative rigidity of their
religious beliefs. Consequently, they were also more likely to believe in an ongoing
cultural war between secularism, a literal embodiment of evil focused on corrupting
religious values, and faithful Christians that requires an active psychological effort to
resist its influences (Watson et al., 2015). A more wholistic illustration of this divide is
the strong association between religiosity and moral purity with science skepticism, or a
rejection of scientific findings and worldviews (i.e., climate change, evolution; Rutjens,
Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018) In the interest of evaluating and explaining this cultural and
psychological conflict, it will be necessary to define religiosity as it relates to this study,
provide an overview of analytic thinking and its conflict with religiosity, and expand
upon defensiveness against secularism as a mediator of this conflict.
Defining Religiosity

In psychology, religiosity has historically been difficult to operationalize due to
its complexity, and the work in defining it is still relatively young (Rusu & Turliuc,
2011). There is a plethora of models that have stemmed from this issue that concern
defining religiosity and disentangling it from spirituality. Some theorists describe
religiosity primarily in behavioral terms (e.g., frequency of church attendance, adherence
to doctrine that governs appropriate behavior), and spirituality as encompassing the
internal and personal component (e.g., the extent to which one seeks a relationship with
God; Shafranske and Maloney, 1990). Given religiosity’s apparent multidimensionality,
others have approached it also constituting several important aspects to it, including
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motivational, emotional, behavioral, and cognitive components (Rusu & Turliuc, 2011).
One of the greatest challenges in measuring religiosity is the need for researchers to
consider those aspects of religiosity which are most important for their study while
maintaining the necessary validity and fidelity to be generalizable to the population of
interest (Hill & Maltby, 2009).
In consideration of these issues, the current study opted for a straightforward
operationalization of religiosity which captures the cognitive-behavioral aspects of
religion as it pertains to the study’s interests. Our project, expanding on work by Gervais
and Norenzayan (2012) which evaluated how analytic thinking strategies promote
religious disbelief, defines religiosity as, “The extent to which belief in God and one’s
identity as a religious individual are the result of a convergent set of intuitive cognitive
processes”. These components of religiosity are suspected to be most involved in
perpetuating the religious-secular conflict.
Belief in God appears to be the core of functional religious belief for many
individuals, as 63% of adults in a survey by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life in
2014 reported being “absolutely certain” about their belief in God. Belief in God, and
religious belief in general, is suggested to be the result of a combination of
developmental factors and intuitively driven cognitive substrates that lend themselves
towards these cognitions (i.e., over-attribution of agency and design; Bloom, 2007;
Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010; McPhetres & Nguyen, 2017). Shenhav, Rand, and Greene
(2012) have also demonstrated that intuitive thinking predicts belief in God, even when
controlling for multiple demographic variables (i.e., education, socioeconomic status,

5

political orientation), and that it may also play a supportive role in intuitive beliefformation processes. Furthermore, beliefs that are broadly applicable and capable of
explaining numerous things are considered to be more meaningful and value, and that the
most valued beliefs “explain everything and are explained by nothing”, such as belief in
God (Preston & Epley, 2005). Preston and Epley (2005) offer that resistance to science,
as in empirical explanations of evolution or religious beliefs, are the result of perceived
threat to religious individuals’ beliefs, or feelings of devaluation of their cherished
beliefs. In response to these threats, affirmation and contemplation of believer’s
cherished beliefs can help control one’s defensive and distress reactions, with some
research demonstrating this effect on a physiological level (Inzlicht & Tullet, 2010).
Identification with one’s religion plays an important function in religiosity
(Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Social identity theory suggests that individuals
conceptualize groups of people as collections of individuals who they perceive
themselves to be “of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this
common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the
valuation of their group and of their membership of it” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). People
use these social categories as cognitive tools to make sense of the social environment,
and to also use it as a self-reference for their identity. Importantly, identities motivate
individuals to maintain positive self-esteem by distinguishing their group from others,
and it is suggested that one of the best ways that this is accomplished is by diminishing
uncertainty by aligning one’s identity more closely with a clearly defined group
(Ysseldyk, et al., 2010). In religious identity, this is especially important when an
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individual’s sense of safety or well-being feels threatened, as they can seek refuge
through their ideology as it may reestablish feelings of security (Kinnvall, 2004). Their
worldview’s shape takes form from an unyielding belief in the unfalsifiable (e.g., God
exists and has a plan) that helps to quell feelings of existential anxiety and offers the
prospect of an eternal and morally righteous group membership (Kinnvall, 2004;
Ysseldyk, et al., 2010). Hence, the current study considered these self-conceptual factors
to comprise a significant aspect of one’s religiosity.
Religion-Analytic Thinking Conflict

Dual-Process Theory. In keeping up with theoretical developments in dualprocess theories, this project follows the distinctions for cognitive styles as described by
Evans and Stanovich (2013). As they outlined in their coalescence of research on dualprocess theories of higher cognition, thinking can be described as consisting of two forms
of information processing: Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 processing, often referred to as
being intuitive, is defined by its autonomous nature and its lack of working memory
usage. Its typical correlates in research include it being automatic, fast, high capacity,
nonconscious, and independent of cognitive ability. Type 2, or reflective/analytic
thinking, is defined by the usage of cognitive decoupling, or hypothetical thinking and its
dependence on working memory. Its typical correlates include being, slow, correlated
with cognitive ability, conscious, abstract, and limited by capacity (Evans & Stanovich,
2013). The correlates listed here are not defining or necessary features of the dual-process
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model, nor are they an exhaustive list of the typical correlates (for a full review refer to
Evans & Stanovich, 2013).

An important form of dual-process theory is that of the default-interventionist,
which suggests that intuitive answers are easily generated for unfamiliar problems, and
that it is the function of analytic reasoning to intervene on the default intuition when it is
insufficient to meet a goal (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). A key component of this
perspective is that cognitive decoupling, an important feature of Type 2 processing, is
crucial for preventing real world representations from being conflated with mental
simulations in order to be able reason hypothetically. Therefore, the ability to reason is
contingent on fulfilling two stringent requirements: overriding default intuitive thinking
(Type 1) and replacing the cognition with analytical reasoning (Type 2).
Effects of Analytical Thinking on Religiosity. There is a substantial body of
empirical literature that supports the notion that analytical thinking has a negative
relationship with religiosity. Zuckerman, Silberman, and Hall (2013) provided metaanalytic evidence for a significant negative relationship between intelligence and
religiosity, which they note may be explained in part by dual processing models of
cognition. They proposed that analytic thinking is more likely to be used by intelligent
people and that this cognitive style then leads to decreased religiosity. Gervais and
Norenzayan (2012) conducted a series of priming manipulation studies that supported
this proposal where analytic thinking promoted religious disbelief. The authors noted that
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while analytic processing is important in religiosity reduction, it is unlikely to be the only
cause for the observed decrements.

Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, and Fugelsang (2012) provided one avenue of
explanation for this idea by demonstrating that analytic cognitive style negatively
impacted religiosity by lowering acceptance of conventional religious belief. Another
partial explanation for why less-analytic people tend to be more religious is that they are
more inefficient at conflict detection during reasoning about their religious beliefs
compared to analytic individuals (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang,
2013). One inference of these findings is that one’s tendency towards analytic versus
intuitive thinking processes may significantly contribute to the likelihood of implicitly
reacting to reasoning conflict between religious beliefs and more secular knowledge.
Work by Gervais (2015) supports this inference: analytic thinking was able to predict
endorsement of evolution, a historically contentious topic in the secular-religious conflict,
even with relevant demographic, religious, and attitudinal variables controlled for.

Defensiveness

Defensiveness has remained relatively conceptually stable throughout the course
of psychology’s history, having been defined as “unconscious reactions to events which
elicit anxiety” (Juni, 1999) in psychoanalysis, or as “defensive responses as adaptations
aimed at ameliorating threats to self-integrity”. Self-affirmation theory suggests that in
general people tend to view themselves as being good, agentic, efficacious and
successful, or as having self-integrity (Steele, 1988; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). When
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people feel that this sense of self-integrity is being threatened, regardless if it is actual or
perceived, they respond defensively against the threat. Defensive responses can be
adaptive in the sense that they protect one’s beliefs (i.e., ignoring dissenting political or
religious opinions), however it can also produce maladaptive consequences as well. Some
of these consequences include rigidity in beliefs and attitudes, as in the case of prejudiced
beliefs (Howell, Gaither, & Ratliff, 2014), or awareness of multicultural shifts eliciting a
defensive reaction of the elimination of ‘nontraditional influences’ (Hong & Cheon,
2017). Nevertheless, defensive responses include a variety of cognitive and behavioral
strategies, such as dismissing threatening information, ignoring a threat, derogating a
perceived threat, or by using alternative sources of self-integrity to dampen its effects
(Sherman & Cohen, 2002).
A major component of self-affirmation theory and defensiveness is the notion that
the self is composed of different aspects, including an individual’s values, roles, and
social identities (e.g., memberships in different types of groups) (Sherman & Cohen,
2006). These components can, of course, be incorporated from religion, especially for
those who highly value their religious identity and beliefs. It is a fundamental theoretical
assumption in the scientific study of religiosity that religion is typically viewed by
laypersons as the foundation for morality (Stavrova & Sigers, 2014). Being such,
religious individuals are likely to incorporate their religious framework as a component
of their self-integrity (i.e., being a good person). Additionally, religiosity is understood to
be utilized as a method of self-enhancement, or elevation of the positivity of their general
self-views (Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2010). Religious individuals tend to respond with
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defensiveness and strong negative affect when their religious worldview is assailed,
especially when the threat is particularly antireligious (i.e., a statement made by a secular
atheist; van de Bos, van Ameijde, & van Gorp, 2006). However, there is some research to
suggest that self-affirmation of religious beliefs (i.e., thinking about strong beliefs) can
aid in the mitigation of the negative effects of threats to the self, such as anxiety (Inzlicht
& Tullett, 2010).

Current Project

While previous research has explored the relationship between analytic thinking
and religiosity and found a robust negative relationship (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli,
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2011; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012; Gervais & Norenzayan,
2012; Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall; 2013; Gervais, 2015), to our knowledge none have
yet to provide an explanation for the mechanism by which these relationships of
cognitive-behavioral, and ultimately cultural, conflict exists. Thus, the current project’s
goal was to experimentally establish causal associations between religiosity and analytic
thinking through replications and novel applications of experimental manipulations to
build an explanatory model with defensiveness against secularism (DAS) as a mediator
for this relationship. Across four studies we utilized several complementary experimental
strategies to test for the generality and robustness of defensiveness against secularism as
a mediator for the relationship between analytic thinking and decreased levels of
religiosity in Christian and secular samples. Figure 1 presents a visual representation of
an overview of the project’s model. These studies build upon the outlined body of
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empirical literature by providing an expanded view of how the cultures of religion and
science clash and the cognitive mechanism by which the belief in this conflict affects
individuals.
In a partial replication of Shenhav, Rand, and Greene (2012), Study 1 assessed the
extent to which analytic thinking decreased religiosity through DAS. Findings were
anticipated to be congruent with previous literature on the analytical thinking-religiosity
relationship with that caveat that analytical thinkers will be lower in DAS. Then in a
similar vein to threat-induction techniques used by van de Bos, van Ameijde, and van
Gorp (2006), Study 2 evaluated the bolstering effect of defensiveness on religiosity. In
line with self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988; Sherman & Cohen, 2006) and previous
work (Preston & Epley, 2005; Inzlicht & Tullet, 2010), religiosity for religious
individuals is expected to be higher as a counterbalancing, defensive response to threats
to self-integrity. Study 3 parallels Study 2 in its threat paradigm, but instead exploratorily
examined whether DAS reduced correlates of analytic thinking (i.e., reasoning ability and
analytical identity). Lastly, Study 4 is a conceptual inversion of Study 1 in that it
investigated the negative effects of priming religiosity, following an established religious
music paradigm (Batara, 2016), on DAS and analytic thinking correlates. As established,
religious priming is understood to undermine analytic thinking and ability; however, this
study will examine whether DAS mediates this relationship for religious individuals.
Because there is the perception that America is being secularized, and it is therefore a
culture where attacking religious faith is the norm, religious individuals will feel
pressured to resist the perceived offense’s influence on them.

12
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CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES’ CHARACTERISTICS

Participants
Participants for Study 1 through 4 were native English speakers based in the
United States who were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk survey pooling
services. Online participants were qualified by Amazon for legitimate participation prior
to working for their service. Participants were compensated $1.00 for their time and
effort. Participants were randomly assigned to a condition for any of the four studies on
Qualtrics survey software. Participants in every study responded to the same
demographic measures on gender, age, religious orientation, and ethnic background.
Individuals who do not identify as Christian or non-religious will be excluded from
analyses. The current project also delivered empirically parallel experiments and
measures to participants; however, for the purpose of the current study they will not be
analyzed nor included. Unrelated to this study, after participating in the studies of interest
for this project, participants also responded to a separate set of survey questions
pertaining to two independent projects on the effect of built environments on affect, and
spirituality. Measures related to these studies were included in analyses, and their
procedures will not be described for brevity.
Sample size, power, and precision
Power analysis suggested a sample size of n = 141 for each study with an
estimated moderate effect size of d = 0.25 to achieve a 0.80 power.
Procedure
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For all studies, participants followed a link to Qualtrics created by the researchers
and provided through Mechanical Turk’s interface to the survey. After providing
participants with key information about the research study and receiving his or her
informed consent, the participants were randomly assigned to one condition from any of
the four studies. The final steps of each study’s process had the participants reporting
their demographic information, and then receiving a code for submission to Amazon for
compensation.
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CHAPTER THREE
STUDY 1: ANALYTIC THINKING DECREASES BELIEF IN GOD

Cognitive style writing task and belief in God
Hypothesis 1. In a partial replication of Shenhav, Rand, and Greene’s (2012)
experiment, religious individuals who are experimentally induced to favor an analytical
cognitive style through a writing task will report reduced belief in God and defensiveness
against secularism compared to those induced to favor intuition. There are no expected
significant differences between secular individuals on religiosity.
Participants. Study 1’s initial sample consisted of N = 162 individuals from the
online pool. However, after accounting for the exclusion criteria, there were n = 76
participants who identified as Christian (Protestant, n = 47; Latter-day Saint n = 2;
Catholic, n = 27), and n = 64 who identified as nonreligious or atheist. Thus, our final
sample was analysis was N = 140.
Design. Study 1 used a 2 (Identity: religious vs. secular) X 2 (Condition:
analytical vs. intuitive) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to
a condition that promoted either analytical or intuitive thinking, and then asked to rate
their belief in god, and perception of a reason as a threat to faith.
Materials. All measures and manipulations were delivered through Qualtrics
survey software.
Cognitive style writing task manipulation. The cognitive writing task is a priming
manipulation adapted from Shenhav et al.’s (2012) study. Participants were given an
open-ended prompt to write about an experience in which they utilized either an intuitive
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or analytical strategy that led to a positive outcome. Experiences where an analytical
strategy was used are described as ones in which participants used a method of “carefully
reasoning through a situation”. Alternatively, experiences where an intuitive strategy was
used are described as ones in which participants followed their “intuition/first instinct”.
The prompts that participants received are presented below.
Analytical-good. “Please write a paragraph (approximately 8 – 10 sentences)
describing a time carefully reasoning through a situation led you in the right direction
and resulted in a good outcome”.
Intuitive-good. “Please write a paragraph (approximately 8 – 10 sentences)
describing a time your intuition/first instinct led you in the right direction and resulted in
a good outcome”.
Belief in God scale. This is a single-item, highly face valid measure of religiosity
which asks participants to “Rate your belief in God on a scale of 0 (God definitely does
not exist) to 100 (God definitely exists)”. This measure has previously been utilized by
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) and has been found to have high convergent validity
with other measures of religious belief.
Defensiveness against secularism measure. A three-item item measure of
defensiveness was adapted from Watson, Chen, Morris, and Stepehenson’s (2015) study
of defense against secularism. Participants were presented with statements concerning
reason as a threat to religion and were then asked to rate their agreement (Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree). The statements are as follows:
“Reason is a threat to faith and must be rejected.”
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“Reason is a weapon that culture uses to destroy faith.”
“The demands of culture and reason to base beliefs on science must be rejected as
incompatible with religion”.
Suspicion check and exclusion criteria. Following the manipulation and response
measures, participants were given an open-ended prompt to guess the hypothesis for the
study, adapted from Gervais and Norenzayan (2012). Any response which specifically
mentions both religion and thinking/cognition/reasoning will be classified as a correct
guess. Participants who guessed correctly were excluded from analysis. Additionally, any
responses that are less than 8 sentences will result in exclusion as well, as per Shenhav et
al.’s (2012) procedures.
Procedure. For Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two
priming conditions (analytical or intuitive thinking style). In both conditions, participants
were prompted to describe a situation in which a particular strategy led to a positive
outcome. Upon submission of their paragraph, the web page transitioned to the response
measures. Participants used a sliding scale to respond to the Belief in God religiosity
measure, following which they responded to the defensiveness against secularism
measure. Completion of their responses were followed by another page transition to the
suspicion check.
Results. In order to investigate the potential effects of priming analytical thinking
on individuals’ beliefs, a two-way ANOVA was first conducted on belief in God by
religious group and experimental condition. The interaction effect was non-significant,
F(1, 136) = 0.193, p = 0.661, suggesting that the effect of the prime on religiosity did not
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differ by one’s religious affiliation. Furthering this finding, the main effect of the
condition was also non-significant, F(1, 136) = 0.029, p = 0.865, as there was no
difference in religiosity between the participants in either the analytical-good or intuitivegood conditions. As would be expected, there was of course a main effect of religious
group, F(1, 136) = 163.714, p <.001, such that Christians (M = 83.124, SD = 22.426)
reported significantly higher belief in God than secular individuals (M = 34.207, SD =
2.43).

Figure 2. Two-way analysis of variance on belief in God by religious group and
experimental condition.
Next, a two-way ANOVA was also done for defensiveness against secularism by
religious group and condition. The interaction effect was non-significant, F(1, 136) =
0.166, p = 0.685. In other words, the effect of the prime on defensiveness was not
dependent on participants’ religious affiliation, similar to the lack of interaction effects
for religiosity. Furthermore, the main effect of the condition was non-significant, F(1,
136) = 0.006, p = 0.94, indicating that participants were no more or less defensive than
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each other in either condition. The main effect of religious group was also nonsignificant, F(1, 136) = 1.911, p = 0.169, suggesting that the secular and religious
participant groups were not appreciably more or less defensive than each other.

Figure 3. Two-way analysis of variance on defensiveness against secularism by religious
group and experimental condition.
Study 1 Discussion. Rather unexpectedly, inducing a mindset that vindicated
intuition (e.g., favored intuition), as Shenhav, Rand, and Greene (2012) put it, did not
elicit a stronger belief in God, unlike the original study. Notably, this study was only a
partial replication. The original study was a 2(cognitive style: reflective versus intuitive)
X 2(valence: positive versus negative) between-subjects design. Here, we elected to only
evaluate positive valence for each mindset and replicated the negative valence aspect in a
separate study. Even so, in Shenhav et al.’s (2012) they found a significant difference
between their intuition-positive (or intuitive-good) and reflection-positive (or analytical-
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good) priming conditions, such that those in the intuition-positive condition reported
stronger belief in God.
It is important to note that they did not necessarily predict a decrease in religiosity
due to analytic thinking, instead an increase in religiosity. Nevertheless, we failed to find
any relative difference between the two conditions whatsoever. One potential reason for
this may simply be that the prime did not effectively invoke any particular cognitive
mindset. Unfortunately, we did not include a manipulation check to ensure that this was
the case. Furthermore, the choice of religiosity measure may have promoted socially
desirable responding, as it is implicated in influencing religiosity reporting (Sedikides &
Gebauer, 2010). Even if participants had been successfully primed to think either
analytically or intuitively, our groups of interest may have felt more strongly inclined to
maintain their social image of their respective identities (i.e., a devout Christian or a
stalwart atheist). This may be especially true for the Christian sample for whom a strong
belief in God is central to their ideologies; thus, any potential effect of either mindset
may have been offset by a greater desire to appear devout.
The introduction of defensiveness against secularism as a mediator for the
analytic-religiosity relationship is novel; alas, there did not appear to be any significant
differences between conditions nor groups. One major issue, as previously mentioned, is
that social desirability effects may have nullified any influence of the prime over the
responses. Even if this were the case, it does not provide sufficient explanation for the
lack of major differences in terms of defensiveness between each group. Rather, not
finding a difference here may be the result of how the secular group was gathered. When
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participants filled out their demographic information, they were given the option to select
from a multitude of religious orientations, but only one secular option: “nonreligious or
atheist”.
Consequently, as can be seen from Figure #, that meant secular group included
those who fall under the umbrella term “spiritual, but not religious”, or those who hold
religiously oriented beliefs but do not identify with any particular religious ideology. In
other words, the secular group may have had some demographic contamination as it did
not consist solely of “true atheists”, or those who reported exactly zero belief in God.
Those who are completely devoid of religious attunement would be expected to not
experience much, if any, defensiveness, as opposed to those who do hold some belief.
After all, their status as the spiritual would be ‘under attack’ by secularization.
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CHAPTER FOUR
STUDY 2: DEFENSIVENESS AGAINST SECULARISM INCREASES RELIGIOUS
BELIEF AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

Fake News on Christmas and belief in God and religious identity
Hypothesis 2. Using a threat-induction paradigm of fake news, similar to van de
Bos, van Ameijde, and van Gorp (2006), religious participants who are primed to be
defensive against secularism were expected to be more willing to report religious belief
and identity as a counterbalancing response to threats to self-integrity. There are no
expected significant differences between secular individuals on religiosity.
Participants. Study 2’s initial sample had N = 251 individuals from the online
pool. After excluding participants who failed the comprehension check the final sample
had N = 206 participants used in analyses. Thusly, there were n = 120 Christian
(Protestant, n = 47; Latter-day Saint, n = 3; Catholic, n = 47) and n = 86 nonreligious or
atheist participants.
Design. Study 2 used a 2 (Identity: religious vs. secular) X 2 (Condition: threat
vs. no-threat) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to a
condition that is either threatening (i.e., antagonistic) or non-threatening to their beliefs
and then responded to religiosity measures.
Materials.
Fake News vignette manipulation: Christmas. Participants were presented with a
fabricated screenshot of a local news website. Each condition had a supposed news story
that described either a secular group who is antagonizing Christianity by allegedly

23

pushing for the removal of the discussion of the religious context of Christmas from
classrooms (threat condition), or a charitable toy drive at an elementary school. Each
screenshot was presented as though they are entirely authentic. An excerpt that represents
the central theme for each vignette for each condition is presented below. The full
vignettes are available as text in Appendix A (threat condition) and Appendix C (nonthreat condition) and as screenshot images in Appendix B and Appendix D, respectively.
Threat condition: “The Grinch is Trying to Steal the ‘Christ’ out of Christmas”.
As one representative stated in a strongly-worded Facebook post:
“These religious beliefs are nothing more than non-empirical, unsubstantiated claims
about reality--- how the world allegedly works. Yet, these Christian “scholars,” as they
call themselves, refer to an anthology with no known author (at best presumably written
by Bronze Age sheep herders) as the ultimate truth. There is no evidence, no reason, and
no rationality behind these claims. This kind of thinking is dangerous […] We should be
pushing for the removal of the religious history of Christmas.”
No-threat condition: “Santa’s Helpers Are in Town Early This Season”. The
Santa’s Little Helpers program is an initiative designed by local elementary school
student, Geoffrey Jameson, age 9, to help those less fortunate than him […] Geoffrey said
the following in a short clip posted to Facebook,
“I know it’s early for Christmas, but I don’t think it can ever be too early.
Christmas is a very special time for friends and families, but I (pause) know that not
everyone is as lucky as me. I get special Christmas presents every year since I was born
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from my parents and my families and Santa. And I know that sometimes Santa Claus
needs lots of help. […]”
Belief in God scale. Study 2 used the same single-item religious belief measure
used in Study 1 that was adapted from Gervais and Norenzayan (2012).
Religious identity statement measure. In order to evaluate the attitudinal
expressions of religiosity, a two-item measure was written for this project. These items
are intended to measure one’s willingness to affirm his or her Christian identity in
different environmental contexts. Participants were asked to type an affirming statement,
“I am religious and believe in God” into a text box, and then on a different page were
prompted to respond to two items regarding the statement. The two items read as follows,
with both “private religious/state university” substituting the location: “I am willing to
make this claim at a [location]” with responses rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1:
Strongly Disagree to 7: Strongly Agree).
Manipulation, legitimacy, and reading comprehension checks. To ensure that
the novel manipulation was successful, participants were checked for level of threat felt
(“To what extent did you find the news articles to be threatening to your beliefs?”; None
at all to A great deal), and whether the stimuli were perceived as authentic (“Have you
heard about this news before today?”; Definitely yes to Definitely not). Additionally,
participants were assessed on whether they were paying attention by answering two
multiple-choice questions on the content of the article. For the threat condition,
participants were asked about the Facebook post quoted (i.e., “What did the Facebook
post call the authors of the Bible?”) and the name of the organization, and the no-threat
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condition were asked for the name of the toy drive program and its founder. The time
spent reading the article was also tracked automatically. Participants who did not answer
the reading comprehension questions correctly were excluded from analyses.
Procedure. For Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to either the threat
or no-threat condition. In both conditions, participants were asked to read a fake news
story about Christmas, and then type a statement about having read it. Then, on the
following web page, participants first responded to the religious belief measure. On a
separate web page, participants responded to the identity statement measure. Lastly,
participants were given four multiple-choice questions that assess the effectiveness of the
manipulation, the perceived legitimacy, and the participant’s reading comprehension.
Results. Self-reported belief in God was subjected to a two-way ANOVA by
religious group and condition. Counter to the hypothesis, the interaction effect was nonsignificant, F(1, 202) = 0.349, p =0.555, indicating that having one’s beliefs threatened
did not increase religiosity for Christians. Additionally, the main effect of the condition
was also non-significant, F(1, 202) = 2.354, p = 0.126, illustrating that participants in the
threat condition did not report substantially different belief in God in comparison to those
in the no-threat condition. Similar to Study 1, as would be expected from the two
observed groups, the main effect of religious group was significant, F(1, 202) = 323.078,
p <.001, indicating that Christians (M = 84.444, SD = 22.308) held substantially stronger
belief in God than secular individuals (M = 19.352, SD = 28.599).
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Figure 4. Two-way analysis of variance on belief in God by religious group and
experimental condition.
In line with the project’s aims of a more wholistic approach to religiosity,
analyses of variance were conducted on religious identity. First, a two-way ANOVA was
also carried out on willingness to affirm a religious identity at a private university by
religious group and condition. The interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 202) =
0.107, p =0.744; thus, the threat condition did not elicit a self-affirmation effect from
Christians. The main effect of the condition was also not significant, F(1, 202) = 2.313, p
= 0.130, as there were no considerable differences between the threat and no-threat
conditions. As should be expected from the demographics of interest, the main effect of
religious group was significant, F(1, 202) = 159.591, p <.001, indicating that Christians
(M = 5.569, SD = 1.439) were far more willing to affirm a religious identity in a
religiously-favorable context than secular individuals (M = 2.703, SD = 2.03).
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Figure 5. Two-way analysis of variance on willingness to affirm a religious identity at a
private, religious university by religious group and condition.

Next, a two-way ANOVA was also run on willingness to affirm a religious
identity at a public, state university by religious group and condition. Similar to the
private context item, the interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 202) = 0.274, p =
0.601, indicating that the threat-condition did not cause Christian participants to respond
to the threat with a stronger sense of identity. The main effect of the condition was also
nonsignificant, F(1, 202) = 0.812, p = 0.369, as both the threat and no-threat conditions
were not meaningfully different in self-reported religious identity. Similar to the analyses
of belief in God and affirmation in a private university, the main effect of religious group
was significant, F(1, 202) = 142.243, p<.001, indicating that Christians (M = 5.55, SD =
1.561) were more willing to affirm a religious, God-believing identity than secular
individuals (M = 2.692, SD = 2.085).
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Figure 6. Two-way analysis of variance on willingness to affirm a religious identity at a
public, state university by religious group and condition

To assess the effectiveness of the fake news stimuli, a two-way ANOVA was
conducted on threat perception by religious group and condition as well. The interaction
effect was significant, F(1, 202) = 24.85, p <.001. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey
HSD test indicated that Christians in the threat condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.566)
perceived the fake news article to be more threatening to their beliefs than Christians in
the no-threat condition (M = 1.893, SD = 1.336). As might be expected given the content
of the stimuli, there were no significant differences between secular participants in the
threat (M = 1.57, SD = 0.543) and no-threat conditions (M = 1.125, SD = 0.563). The
main effect of condition was also significant, F(1, 202) = 24.85, p <.001, with post hoc
comparisons using Tukey HSD test having indicated participants in the threat-condition
(M = 2.259, SD = 1.549) also perceived their fake news article to be more threatening
than those did in the no-threat condition (M = 1.645, SD = 1.198). Lastly, the main effect
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of religious group was significant, F(1, 202) = 58.05, p <.001, with post hoc comparisons
using Tukey’s HSD test indicating that Christians(M = 2.419, SD = 1.548) generally
perceived significantly higher threat than secular participants (M = 1.143, SD = 0.549).

Figure 7. Two-analysis of variance on manipulation check of perception of threat by
religious group and experimental condition.

Study 2 Discussion. While it was predicted that participants would report greater
religiosity as a form of self-affirmation to mitigate the negative effects of threat on selfintegrity, subjecting participants to threat did not cause any changes. As can be seen from
analysis of the manipulation check, the threat stimulus was in fact seen as threatening to
participants’ beliefs. To address the lack of meaningful alterations in religiosity, a study
by Norenzayan, Dar-Nimrod, Hansen, and Proulx (2009) offers some insight. While they
evaluated mortality salience as a source of threat, rather than a cultural threat (instead
used as an outcome), they highlight the multiplicity of worldviews people deal with.
People balance multiple values and membership in different social groups, such as
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association with a secular worldview (i.e., civilization hospitable towards religious
freedom) and religion.
In their study, they found that secular participants primed with mortality salience
consistently derogated a culturally threatening message as a defensive reaction, but the
religious showed no changes. Norenzayan et al. (2009) succinctly point out that for the
religious they may have competing stances: one that is religiously oriented and one that is
a secular cultural stance. The use of one mental framework over the other is contingent
on multiple factors, including salience. For Study 2, while the manipulation may have
been designed to explicitly reference religion, it is difficult to say whether it was
sufficient to make one’s religiosity salient. The supposed impending threat of removing
religious discussion from a classroom may have been more associated with political
identity (i.e., infringement of First Amendment rights) instead. The manipulation check
additionally does not parse out what the participant’s “beliefs” are exactly that are being
threatened.
Generally, the manipulation may not have meaningfully activated any schema
related to the secular-religious cultural conflict. Thus, religious participants may have
merely experienced an affront to an unrelated set of beliefs (seen as the highly perceived
threat), rather than assault on their self-integrity (i.e., religious beliefs and identity).
Alternatively, it may simply be that the threat stimulus also functioned as a reminder of
self-worth, effectively inoculating the participant to adverse defensive reactions by selfaffirming in preparation (i.e., reading a headline with “Christ” in it) (Critcher, Dunning,
& Armor, 2010). Thereby, potentially masking the changes in religiosity we had
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predicted. To put it simply, self-affirmation and feelings of defensiveness may have been
experienced, but the ‘timing’ of our measures in this cognitive process were inadequate.
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CHAPTER FIVE
STUDY 3: DEFENSIVENESS AGAINST SECULARISM DECREASES
ANALYTICAL REASONING AND SECULAR IDENTITY

Fake News on libraries and secular measures
Hypothesis 3. There will be an interaction effect of religious identity and identity
threat on endorsement of reason. In particular, religious participants in the threat
condition will report lower levels of willingness to endorse reason and poorer
performance on ability-based measures than those in the no-threat condition. Secular
participants in the threat condition will report similar willingness to endorse reason and
have similar performance on an ability-based measure to those in the no-threat condition
within their group.
Participants. Study 3’s initial sample had N = 241 participants from the online
pool. After excluding participants who failed the comprehension checks, our final sample
used in data analysis was N = 180, with there being n = 106 Christian (Protestant, n = 60;
Latter-day Saint, n = 2; Catholic, n = 44) and n = 74 nonreligious or atheist participants.
Design. Similar to Study 2, Study 3 used a 2 (Identity: religious vs. secular) X 2
(Condition: threat vs. no-threat) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly
assigned to a condition that was either threatening (i.e., antagonistic) or non-threatening
and then responded to religiosity measures.
Materials.
Fake News vignette manipulation: Libraries. Similar to the manipulations used
in Study 2, participants were presented with a fabricated screenshot of a local news
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website. Each condition had a supposed news story that described either a secular group
who is antagonizing Christianity by allegedly pushing for the relocation of religious texts
in libraries to inconvenient locations, or libraries advertising an initiative to encourage
library visits with free streaming services (i.e., Netflix). An excerpt that represents the
central theme for each vignette for each condition is presented below. The full vignettes
are available as text in Appendix E (threat condition) and Appendix G (non-threat
condition) and as screenshot images in Appendix F and Appendix H, respectively.
Experimental condition: “Faith is Under Attack: Secularist Pushing of Literary
Boundaries”. These ‘secular humanists’ want all versions of the Bible, among other
religious texts and Christian-oriented literature, to be moved to either the back of libraries
or nearest the fiction sections. As one representative stated in a strongly-worded
Facebook post:
“These religious beliefs are nothing more than non-empirical, unsubstantiated
claims about reality--- how the world allegedly works […] Our first step is simple: move
all religious text (especially the Bible considering where we live in the South) to where it
belongs--- the darkness of a library’s corners, or nearest the literature that best
supplements it--- with fiction.”
Control condition: “Local Libraries Providing Free Netflix and Hulu Premium”.
That’s right: thanks to the More Viewers, More Readers Initiative you can go to one of
the following libraries (link removed) and check out a registered device that will allow
you to watch your favorite shows and movies from home. One librarian from Seneca said
the following in a Facebook post:
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Friends and family! I have an exciting announcement to make! Have you ever
wanted to use Netflix or Hulu Premium but could never justify the cost? […] Our
thinking is that if we can get more people to physically walk in to the library, even for
something like free Netflix, then they will be more inclined to make use of our other
services […]”.
GRE Analytic Reasoning questions. Syllogistic reasoning questions were
adapted from the GRE (Graduate Record Examinations) to assess analytical thinking
from an ability-based perspective, similar to Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre’s
(2007) evaluation of analytic reasoning. Syllogisms are statements that present an
argument in three parts (two statements and a conclusion), but the logic of the conclusion
is not dependent on whether the statements or the conclusion is true. Participants were
given 10 syllogisms and then asked to identify their logic as either valid or invalid. An
example with its answer is presented below. The entirety of this measure is available in
Appendix I.
No fruits are fungi.
All mushrooms are fungi.
Therefore, some mushrooms are fruits.
(Answer: Invalid).
Secular identity statement measure. Similar to the religious identity measure in
Study 2, a novel measure was created for this project to assess attitudinal expressions of
secularism or reason. These items are intended to measure one’s willingness to affirm his
or her identity as an analytical thinker in different environmental contexts. Participants
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were asked to type an affirming statement, “I believe that analytical thinking is the only
reasonable way to parse out the truth of the universe and make sense of the world,” into a
text box, and then on a different page were prompted to respond to two items regarding
the statement. The two items read as follows, with both “private religious/state
university” substituting the location: “I am willing to make this claim at a [location]”
with responses rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1: Strongly Disagree to 7: Strongly
Agree).
Manipulation, legitimacy, and reading comprehension checks. The
manipulation and legitimacy checks used for this study were identical to Study 2. Also,
participants were assessed on their comprehension of the article by answering multiplechoice questions on its content. For the threat condition, participants were asked about
the Facebook post quoted in the article (i.e., “What did the Facebook post call the authors
of the Bible?”) and the organization mentioned, and the no-threat condition will ask for
the name of the free video streaming library program and to name one of the devices the
library offers for use. The time spent reading the article was also tracked automatically.
Participants who failed to answer the reading comprehension questions correctly were
excluded from the final analyses.
Procedure. Participants followed a similar procedure to Study 2. For Study 3,
participants were randomly assigned to either the threat or no-threat condition. In both
conditions, participants were asked to read a fake news story about libraries, and then
type a statement about having read it. Then, on the following web page, participants
responded to the syllogistic reasoning questions. On a separate web page, participants
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responded to the identity statement measure. Lastly, participants were given four
multiple-choice questions that assessed the effectiveness of the manipulation, the
perceived legitimacy, and the participant’s comprehension and memory of the article’s
content.
Results. A two-way ANOVA was utilized on performance on the syllogistic
reasoning questions by condition and religious group. The interaction effect was nonsignificant, F(1, 176) = 1.592, p = 0.209. Therefore, the effect of threat on performance
did not depend on one’s religious affiliation. The main effect of the condition was also
non-significant, F(1, 176) = 0.287, p = 0.593, as both participants in the threat and nothreat conditions did not differ noticeably in performance. The main effect of religious
group was non-significant, F(1, 176) = 1.096, p = 0.297. Thus, Christian and secular
participants performed similarly to each other. In sum, there were no meaningful
differences between any of the groups in their performance.
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Figure 8. Two-way analysis of variance on performance on GRE logic measure by
religious group and condition
To address the second part of Study 3’s hypothesis, a two-way ANOVA was used
on the secular identity measure’s two items by condition and religious group. For
willingness to affirm an analytic identity at a private, religious university, there was no
interaction effect, F(1, 176) = 0.071, p = 0.789. Thus, being threatened did not impact
willingness to identify as an analytic thinker in a religiously-favorable context, nor did
changes in willingness vary by religious affiliation. However, in partial support of the
hypothesis, there was a main effect for the condition, F(1, 176) = 9.829, p<.01, with post
hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicating that participants in the threatcondition (M = 3.740, SD = 1.835) were less willing to affirm an analytical-based identity
in a religiously-favorable environmental context than those in the no-threat condition (M
= 4.575, SD = 1.712). The main effect for religious group was nonsignificant, F(1, 176) =

38

3.066, p = 0.082, as Christian and secular participants were not meaningfully different
from each other in terms of willingness to share an analytic identity with others.

Figure 9. Two-way analysis of variance on willingness to affirm a secular identity at a
private, religious university by religious group and condition.

For willingness to affirm a secular identity at a public, state university, there was
no interaction effect, F(1, 176) = 0.261, p = 0.609. Therefore, have one’s beliefs
threatened did not impact willingness to identify as an analytic thinker in a secular
context, nor did changes in willingness vary by religious affiliation. Unlike the privatecontext item, there was no main effect for the condition, F(1, 176) = 2.971, p =.087.
There was, however, a main effect for religious group, F(1, 176) = 8.298, p <.01, with
post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicating that secular individuals (M =
4.919, SD = 1.749) were more willing than Christians (M = 4.160, SD = 1.779) to affirm

39

an analytical thinker identity.

Figure 10. Two-way analysis of variance on willingness to affirm a secular identity at a
public, state university by religious group and condition

To assess whether participants were truly threatened by the fake news article
stimuli, a two-way ANOVA was conducted on threat perception by religious group and
condition. The interaction effect was significant, F(1, 176) = 22.32, p<.001. Post hoc
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that Christians in the experimental
condition (M = 3.138, SD = 1.456) perceived the fake news article about libraries to be
more threatening than Christians in the no-threat condition (M = 1.479, SD = 0.967).
Unsurprisingly, there were no significant differences between secular participants in the
threat (M = 1.286, SD = 0.596) and no-threat conditions (M = 1.094, SD = 0.296), due to
the stimuli being geared towards threatening Christian beliefs. The main effect of
condition was also significant, F(1, 176) =46.00, p<.001, such that post hoc comparisons
using the Tukey HSD test indicated that participants in the threat condition (M = 2.360,
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SD = 1.487) than the no-threat condition (M = 1.325, SD = 0.792). Finally, the main
effect of religious group was significant, F(1, 176) = 61.18, p <.001, with post hoc
comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicating that Christians(M = 2.387, SD = 1.503)
generally perceived their article to be a greater threat to their beliefs than secular
participants did (M = 1.203, SD = 0.496).

Figure 11. Two-way analysis of variance on manipulation check of perception of threat
by religious group and experimental condition

Study 3 Discussion. As mentioned, Study 3 parallels Study 2 in its overall
design: presenting a threatening stimulus that increases defensiveness against secularism
which should then adversely affect performance on ability-based measures of reason and
identification with secularism. However, threatening a participant’s beliefs did not lead to
any changes in performance. Both Christian and secular participants performed similarly.
This is rather unexpected considering that previous work on logical reasoning points to
emotional experiences worsening performance on similar measures, due at least in part to
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the cognitive load wrought by negative emotions (DeWall, Baumeister, & Masicampo,
2008; Trémolière, Gagnon, & Blanchette, 2016). Similar to Study 2, the manipulation
check does point to the threat condition being perceived as threatening, but it is possible
that it did not elicit any affective reaction through which performance could be impaired.
As for the secular identity measure, there was only partial support of our
hypothesis: participants who were threatened were less willing to affirm an analyticalbased identity in a private, religious university than those who were not threatened. While
there was no divergence in religious groups, this difference in conditions can best be
explained by taking the motivations of the groups into consideration. Although their
approach to religiosity followed the traditions of measuring it in terms of intrinsicextrinsic orientation, Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman (2011) evaluated the effect of
identity threat on appraisal-coping processes and illustrated how religiosity can guide
one’s reactions to stress. Importantly, they found that the type of identity (religious
versus nonreligious) being assailed yielded differential effects for religiosity and coping
strategies. When religious identity was threatened, it elicited sadness and anger which
were associated with more emotionally oriented coping strategies (i.e., emotional
expression) and problem-focused strategies. Their findings also highlight that when faced
with religious threat, intrinsic orientation was predictive of responding to the threat with
confrontational actions and a refusal to accept the situation. In Study 3, the rejection of a
secular identity (e.g., reduced willingness to affirm) may be a function of this stress
response. It may be that participants are in essence resisting the effects of the secular
movement described in the threat condition by disidentifying with its tenets and
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implicitly reaffirming their own identity as a religious individual by “siding” with the
private university.
As for the atheists in the secular group, Abbott and Mollen (2018) offer some
insight. They point out atheists are a fairly underrepresented population in the literature
and what is known about them is that they are typically regarded rather poorly by others.
Qualities typically attributed by others to atheists include perceptions of
untrustworthiness (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011), proneness to anger (Meier,
Fetterman, Robinson, & Lappas, 2015), and immorality (Cook, Cottrell, & Webster,
2015). The authors make it clear that being an atheist is stigmatized within U.S. culture
and that atheists are disincentivized from sharing their otherwise concealable identity as
doing so can often be met with stigma and even discrimination. Likewise, while our
project does not quantifiably distinguish between atheists (e.g., those with a total lack of
belief in a god) and nonreligious “others” (i.e., ‘spiritual but not religious’), from what
research there is concerning this secondary group it appears that they share similar
perceptions and experiences concerning their identities (Sumerau & Cragun, 2016).
Notably, Abott and Mollen’s (2018) study found that higher levels of anticipated
stigma were related with less disclosure and more concealment of an atheist identity.
These preliminary findings elucidate some of the potential motivations for the secular
participants in the threat-condition, as a private, religious university is unlikely to be seen
as a hospitable environment towards a secular identity, especially if it is from the
perspective of an atheist. Therefore, given the hypothetical nature of the measure, it is
sensible that they would respond with lower willingness to share an otherwise sensitive
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identity in an environment that they are likely to anticipate high stigma from.
Corroborating this, while the analysis of the public university item yielded no statistically
significant effects, it does assist in pulling this picture together. After all, in a neutral or
even secularly favorable environment, there is likely little stigma or resistance expected
by either the religious or nonreligious participants in response to an analytic, secular
identity being shared.
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CHAPTER SIX
STUDY 4: RELIGIOUS MUSIC AFFECTS IDENTIFICATION WITH REASONING

Music Priming and secular identity
Hypothesis 4. Religious participants whose religious identity is primed to be
salient will lead to a rejection of reason in favor of faith (i.e., higher defensiveness),
which therefore will lead to a lower level of willingness to endorse reason. This effect
will be strongest for those who are primed with religiously congruous music (i.e.,
Christian) and moderate for incongruent music (i.e., Muslim). Secular participants who
are primed with religious identity should not produce any significant differences.
Participants. Study 4’s initial sample had N = 365 individuals from the online
pool. After removing participants who failed the attention check, the final sample used in
data analyses had N = 169, with n = 96 Christian (Protestant, n = 52; Latter-day Saint, n =
2, Catholic, n = 42) and n = 73 nonreligious or atheist participants.
Design. Study 4 used a 2 (Identity: religious vs. secular) X 3 (Music type:
congruous religious vs. incongruent vs. neutral) between-subjects design. Participants
were randomly assigned to any of the potential music conditions.
Materials.
Music Priming manipulation. Study 4 adapts the music priming paradigm from
Batara (2016); however, this study has added congruity as a facet for evaluation. The
religious congruous song that was used is the Christian hymn “Rock of Ages” composed
by Augustus Toplady in 1775 and performed by the Antrim Mennonite Choir. The
religious incongruous song was a Muslim prayer call by Ahmad Al-Nafees. Lastly, the
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neutral song that functions as the control condition was “Twinkle Twinkle Little Star” as
performed by the Westminster Choir.
Secular identity statement measure. Study 4 used the same secular identity
measure as Study 3 to assess attitudinal expressions of secularism or reason. These items
are intended to measure one’s willingness to affirm his or her identity as an analytical
thinker in different environmental contexts.
Defensiveness against secularism measure. Study 4 used the same defensiveness
measure as Study 1 and Study 2. Participants were presented with statements concerning
reason as a threat to religion and are then asked to rate their agreement (Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree).
Manipulation and relevance check. Participants responded to two items designed
to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation (“’Listening to this music reminds me of
religion’. To what extent do you agree with this statement?”; 1: Strongly Disagree to 7:
Strongly Agree), and the personal relevance to the participant (“How often do you listen
to this type of music?”; Daily to Never”). The time spent listening to the music was also
tracked. Participants who did not listen to at least half of the song (approximately 1.5
minutes on average) were excluded from the final analyses.
Procedure. For Study 4, participants were randomly assigned to listen to one of
three possible types of songs that are congruous with their religion (i.e., Christian),
incongruent, or neutral. Participants were asked to play a video embedded into the survey
that contained the music along with its lyrics on display. Once it had been listened to in
its entirety, they typed into an open-ended textbox that they had completed the task. Then
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on a separate web page, participants responded to the identity statement measure,
followed by the defensiveness measure on a different page. Lastly, answered the
manipulation and relevance check items.
Results. A three-way ANOVA was conducted first on the defensiveness against
secularism measure by music prime condition and religious group. The interaction effect
was non-significant, F(2, 163) = 0.889, p = 0.409. Priming religious identity did not
affect Christians’ defensiveness. The main effect of the music prime condition was also
non-significant for defensiveness, F(2, 163) = 1.571, p = 0.211, suggesting that
participants did not experience changes in defensiveness due to the musical stimuli.
Notably, the main effect of religious group was significant, F(1, 163) = 41.051, p <.001.
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that secular participants (M =
1.729, SD = 0.979) were generally less defensive than Christians (M = 3.408, SD =
1.715).

Figure 12. Three-way analysis of variance on defensiveness against secularism by
religious group and experimental condition.
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Next, a three-way ANOVA was run on the secular identity measure by music
prime condition and religious group. First, willingness to affirm a secular identity at a
private, religious university was evaluated. The interaction effect was not significant,
F(2, 163) = 0.398, p = 6723. Participants did not differ in their willingness to affirm a
secular identity, regardless of their religious affiliation. The main effect of the three
conditions was also nonsignificant, F(2, 163) = 2.461, p = 0.089, suggesting that
participants who were primed with a religious identity did not experience the need to
reject reason, as was hypothesized. There was a significant difference between secular
and Christian participants, as the main effect of religious group was significant, F(1, 163)
= 5.479, p < .05. Post hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD reveal that the secular
participants (M = 4.233, SD = 2.141) were less willing than the Christian participants (M
= 4.600, SD = 1.629).

Figure 13. Three-way analysis of variance on willingness to affirm a secular identity at a
private, religious university by religious group and experimental condition.
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The three-way ANOVA for willingness to affirm a secular identity a public, state
university revealed that the interaction effect was non-significant too, F(2, 163) = 0.202,
p = 0.817. Thus, neither religious affiliation’s participants’ identification with secular
reasoning was affected by the stimuli. The main effect of the condition was
nonsignificant as well, F(2, 163) = 2.268, p = 0.107. Lastly, there were no significant
differences between the religious groups, F(1, 163) = 0.247, p = 0.620.

Figure 14. Three-way analysis of variance on willingness to affirm a secular identity at a
public, state university by religious group and experimental condition.
Study 4 Discussion. Study 4 was exploratory in nature and was designed as a
conceptual inversion of Study 1. Interestingly, there were significant differences between
the Christian and secular participants in their defensiveness against secularism, with
Christians being more defensive. It is difficult to say whether this effect is generalizable
however, given that in Study 1 these group differences were not found whatsoever.
Additionally, secular participants were less willing than the Christian participants to
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affirm a secular identity, although this difference is likely due to the same motivations
outlined in Study 3 (Abbot & Mollen, 2018). Otherwise, the religious prime did not
appear to have any detrimental effect on Christian participants’ willingness to affirm a
secular identity. This may be similar to the case of Study 2 — while religious identity
may have been made salient, there was not an equivalent, competing salience of a secular
identity for participants to explicitly reject (Norenzayan, Dar-Nimrod, Hansen, & Proulx,
2009).
Alternatively, it may be that the Christian participants did not take issue with
holding seemingly dissonant views: simultaneously believing that reason is the only way
to understand the nature of reality and believing that reason is an enemy of faith that is
incompatible with religion. Looking to cognitive dissonance theory on inconsistent
attitudes sheds some light on this paradox: Festinger (1957) proposed that individuals
must realize that there is a discrepancy between cognitions in order to experience
distress, and then act to alleviate it (i.e., altering their beliefs or attitudes to match one
cognition). Perhaps if we had made it clear to participants that they held a hypocritical
stance, the hypothesized decrements in identification with reason would have been seen
alongside the defensiveness reaction, although further research is necessary.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Conclusions
Four experimental studies were conducted to evaluate a cultural belief in a war on
religion by secularism as a potential mediator in the analytic-religiosity conflict that is
often reported. Study 1 aimed to replicate in part previous work by Shenhav, Rand, and
Greene (2012) on analytic thinking reducing religiosity, and also assessed whether it
affected and if individuals held differential beliefs in a cultural conflict between religion
and secularism. Contrary to previous studies that argue in favor of this cognitive conflict
between analytic thinking and religiosity (Gervais, 2015; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr,
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013; Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013; Gervais &
Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012), this study did not
find any support for this hypothesis. As for the proposed mediator, defensiveness against
secularism, Study 1 did not provide any evidence for this either, as reports of DAS were
unaffected by cognitive style.
Study 2 sought to evaluate whether threatening a participant’s religiosity would
elicit greater identification with their religion and belief in God as a way to ameliorate
their presumed psychological state of defensiveness against secularism. While the
participants did experience some form of threat, whether their religious beliefs were
threatened or if a feeling of defensiveness was even instilled were unclear. Resultantly,
we did not see the anticipated changes in religiosity. Similar to Study 2 in design, Study 3
only found partial support for the hypothesis that threat would decrease willingness to
identify with analytic thinking. In general, participants who read a threatening fake news
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article were less willing to share a secular identity at a private university than those who
did not. Prior research on identity threat and stigma provide possible explanations for
this outcome. Religious participants may be rejecting the secular identity as a coping
response to the stress caused by the threat towards their religious identity (Ysseldyk,
Matheson, & Anisman, 2011), while secular participants may be more wary of sharing
their identity in a context that is likely to be prejudiced towards the nonreligious
(Sumerau & Cragun, 2016; Abbott & Mollen, 2018).
Out of all four studies, Study 4 ended up providing some curious insight into
religious cognition and how it relates to the cultural conflict between religion and
secularism. Particularly, this study explored whether religiosity had any influence over
analytic identity and defensiveness against secularism. While the music primes did not
have the hypothesized effect, there were significant differences between the Christian and
secular participants in their defensiveness — Christians believed more strongly that
reason is a cultural weapon used against religion. At the same time, however, there were
no significant differences between the two groups in their willingness to share a secular
identity. This is interesting when considered with the differences in defensiveness, as this
suggests that Christian participants simultaneously held two incompatible cognitions: a
belief in analytical thinking as the sole means to understand reality and a belief that
reason must be rejected as an enemy of faith. Although this is a somewhat indirect
observation, this may provide part of an answer as to how religious individuals who see
the influence of secularism as corrupting operate in a world that is increasingly
secularized without it affecting their religiosity. These individuals may be
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accommodating one set of beliefs to match with the other (Uecker & Longest, 2017)
which would not have been picked up by our measures nor was it the intent of this study
to specifically assess. If this were the case, then cognitive dissonance theory suggests that
such attitudinal accommodation is the result of internally acknowledging that the two
cognitions are inherently incompatible (Festinger, 1957). Further research is necessary to
determine whether spotlighting this hypocritical stance would lead to the changes in both
defensiveness and identification with reason that we had hypothesized.

Limitations. Each study faced their own unique limitations that may have
hindered their experimental designs. In Study 1, we did not include a means to ensure
that the cognitive style prime was actually effective in invoking either an analytic or
intuitive mindset. Instead we had presumed that it would work because it had worked in a
previous study (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). Because of this it is difficult to be
certain whether the failure to replicate is due to an impotent prime, unknown
methodological issues, or a flaw in the supposed strength of the analytic-religiosity
hypothesis. After all, some research has pointed out that the effects for analytic thinking
decreasing religious belief tend to be small (Sanchez, Sundermeier, Gray, & CalinJageman, 2017) with indeterminate cross-cultural generalizability (Gervais, et al., 2018),
and, in some cases, even the reverse where it increases religious belief (Yilmaz & Isler,
2019). Diverging from a direct assessment of this conflict hypothesis, Study 2 had
suffered from a similar issue to Study 1, whereby it is uncertain whether the stimulus
sufficiently activated schema that are relevant (e.g., religious identity being under assault
by secularism). Relatedly, it is only presumed that individuals’ religious beliefs would
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have been assailed by the stimulus, given the contextual information, as opposed to some
other set of beliefs (i.e., views on education). Much like Study 2, Study 3 did not have
sufficient controls to ensure that views on stigma, affective state, or incorrectly targeted
beliefs and identity were responsible for the outcomes that were found.
The major limiting factor of Study 4 is that participants were trusted to listen to
the musical primes in their full extent before responding to the measures. However,
unlike Batara (2016) who conducted a laboratory study, we utilized online participants
who we could not ensure would actually listen to the songs. It is possible, and even
likely, that an unknown number of participants averted the manipulation by, for example,
muting the music and waiting for the song’s duration to end before responding. The
goodwill of participants and excluding participants who did not meet the length criteria
were likely insufficient for any possible effects of the primes to take place, hence the null
effects found.
Generally, the results of these studies may have been affected by the use of online
participants rather than bringing participants to a physical location where situational
conditions can be homogenous and controlled for. However, there is evidence to show
that the effects and validity of interactive experiments are not limited or negatively
impacted by the use of Mechanical Turk any more than on-site participants would,
provided that the study is rigorously developed with technical constraints in mind
(Thomas & Clifford, 2017). Previous research on the analytic thinking-religiosity
relationship has been criticized for not controlling for order effects (i.e., measuring
religiosity after analytic thinking), an issue which may have affected this project as well.
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Pennycook, Ross, Kohler, and Fugelsang (2016) conducted additional studies and a metaanalysis to address these concerns and found that the correlation remained robust:
analytic thinking negatively correlates with religious belief, and atheists and agnostics are
more reflective than religious believers. In sum, these four studies proved to be highly
exploratory and suffered from the flaws that follow such experiments, especially given
that the bedrock hypothesis of the analytic-religiosity conflict may be less sturdy than
previously understood.
Future directions. This project sought to address relatively simple theoretical
questions that impact the lives of both religious and secular individuals: “Why do some
Christians oppose science? Why do religion and science conflict in the United States?”.
This overarching study attempted to demonstrate a causal mechanism to explain the
observable phenomenon of the conflict between religion and secularism as they manifest
in the negative association between religiosity and analytic thinking. Instead, this study
provided evidence that this negative relationship may not be as robust as once thought, a
conclusion shared by some others (Yilmaz, & Isler, 2019; Gervais, et al., 2018; Sanchez,
Sundermeier, Gray, & Calin-Jageman, 2017). Future research into this interesting
relationship should take into consideration the limitations outlined in this study and by
others. Most importantly, as is always the case, further replications are necessary in order
to demonstrate whether or not this hypothesis is truly as robust as it is purported to be.
Furthermore, this study is among the first to investigate some potential correlates of the
relationship, namely religious and nonreligious identity and defensiveness against
secularism. While support for these correlates are mixed, continued research into the
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influence of culture on religious cognition and information processing is crucial. The
criticality of this should not be discounted considering the inseparable nature of culture
and religion and their general impact on the development of human cognition and
behavior.
There is an ever-widening ideological chasm in American society that is likely
being worsened by this cultural conflict. This is apparent in the volatile polarization of
political parties, views on legal issues (e.g., abortion, transgender and gay rights, science
education), and issues that concern the well-being of all of humankind, such as climate
change and vaccinations (i.e., anti-science movements). Science-advocates and
researchers have been working towards an answer for these issues that drive the divide, in
the hope of establishing a common ground between traditional religious communities and
those of secularism, such as academia (Calhoun, 2011; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;
Gervais, 2015). This project contributes towards the efforts made by others to explain the
mechanisms that underly the rejection of scientific progress, secularism, and reason, and
this understanding can hopefully lend itself to potentially developing a means to promote
acceptance of science as a beneficial cultural force, and decrease perceptions of it being
an antireligious antagonist.
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Appendix A
Fake News Vignette (Threat condition): Christmas (Text)
“The Grinch is Trying to Steal the ‘Christ’ Out of Christmas”
As of October 9, 2018, there has been an insurgence of secularists from an
organization known as “Secular Humanists for Rationality and Reason” showing up at
Oconee/Pickens County Council meetings in an attempt at pushing legislators to
authorize and enforce a highly controversial public elementary school policy. These
‘secular humanists’ want to remove all discussion of the religious origins of Christmas
from elementary school classrooms. As one representative stated in a strongly-worded
Facebook post:
“These religious beliefs are nothing more than non-empirical, unsubstantiated
claims about reality--- how the world allegedly works. Yet, these Christian “scholars,” as
they call themselves, refer to an anthology with no known author (at best presumably
written by Bronze Age sheep herders) as the ultimate truth. There is no evidence, no
reason, and no rationality behind these claims. This kind of thinking is dangerous. It is a
danger to those children who have yet to fully form a functional grasp on their world, let
alone their basic cognitive faculties. Our world, the modern era, is one that should be
dominated by critical analysis, careful evaluation of evidence, and the scientific process if
we ever want to move forward as a society. So why are we talking about a tradition of
mass delusional belief in a man who was allegedly born some 2000 years ago, was killed,
and then resurrected, when such a magical belief falls so flatly in the face of any level of
scientific scrutiny? Is it not the basis of our society to have a separation of church and
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state? Why then does this kind of cultural indoctrination take place in our classrooms
(paid for by our tax dollars taken by our allegedly religiously unaffiliated governments)
where our children are so easily influenced by authority figures? So then, it’s simple. We
should be pushing for the removal of the religious history of Christmas.”
Strong support for this type of legislature has arisen from online secular and
atheistic communities where this story has caught on (such as Reddit), alongside the
horrified, indignant outcries of concerned families, congregations, and religious leaders
in the community.
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Appendix B
Fake News Vignette (Threat condition): Christmas (Image)
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Appendix C
Fake News Vignette (No-threat condition): Christmas (Text)
“Santa’s Helpers Are in Town Early This Season”
As of October 9, 2018, there has been a slow, but steady rise in public elementary
schools taking the initiative for this upcoming holiday season. The Santa’s Little Helpers
program is an initiative designed by local elementary school student, Geoffrey Jameson,
age 9, to help those less fortunate then him. The program involves having children in
every class donate a single toy of their own (or purchased brand new by mom and dad
through “Santa’s elves”) in a toy drive hosted by the elementary school that will then be
given to children in less fortunate families and foster homes. Geoffrey said the following
in a short clip posted to Facebook,
“I know it’s early for Christmas, but I don’t think it can ever be too early.
Christmas is a very special time for friends and families, but I (pause) know that not
everyone is as lucky as me. I get special Christmas presents every year since I was born
from my parents and my families and Santa. And I know that sometimes Santa Claus
needs lots of help. That’s why he has so many elves. So, I think that with our teachers
and families helps we can be like Santa’s elves. (Johnathan Jameson, Geoffrey’s father,
off-camera: So what do you want to be like, son?) I want to be like Santa Claus because
he loves everyone, and, and I think that everyone wants to be like him too. So, um,
together, we can be Santa’s Little Helpers!! Yeah!!! (runs off-camera)”.
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The popularity of this initiative has started to gain traction in the rest of
Geofrrey’s school district. Other school districts have begun talks of implementing this
initiative as well to spread some holiday cheer to less fortunate children.
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Appendix D
Fake News Vignette (No-threat condition): Christmas (Image)
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Appendix E
Fake News Vignette (Threat condition): Libraries (Text)
“Faith is Under Attack: Secularist Pushing of Literary Boundaries”
As of October 9, 2018, there has been an insurgence of secularists from an
organization known as “Secular Humanists for Rationality and Reason” showing up at
Oconee/Pickens County Council meetings in an attempt at pushing legislators to
authorize and enforce a highly controversial public library policy. These ‘secular
humanists’ want all versions of the Bible, among other religious texts and Christianoriented literature, to be moved to either the back of libraries or nearest the fiction
sections. As one representative stated in a strongly-worded Facebook post:
“These religious beliefs are nothing more than non-empirical, unsubstantiated
claims about reality--- how the world allegedly works. Yet, these Christian “scholars,” as
they call themselves, refer to an anthology with no known author (at best presumably
written by Bronze Age sheep herders) as the ultimate truth. There is no evidence, no
reason, and no rationality behind these claims. This kind of thinking is dangerous. It is a
danger to those children who have yet to fully form a functional grasp on their world, let
alone their basic cognitive faculties. Our world, the modern era, is one that should be
dominated by critical analysis, careful evaluation of evidence, and the scientific process if
we ever want to move forward as a society. In order to help all of us move close to this,
we should inoculate our children from the throes of religion which have plagued and held
back human society for millennia. Our first step is simple: move all religious text
(especially the Bible considering where we live in the South) to where it belongs--- the
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darkness of a library’s corners, or nearest the literature that best supplements it--- with
fiction.”
Strong support for this type of legislature has arisen from online secular and
atheistic communities where this story has caught on (such as Reddit), alongside the
horrified, indignant outcries of concerned families, congregations, and religious leaders
in the community.
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Appendix F
Fake News Vignette (Threat condition): Libraries (Image)
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Appendix G
Fake News Vignette (No-threat condition): Libraries (Text)
“Local Libraries Providing Free Netflix and Hulu Premium”
As of October 9, 2018, there has been a slow, but steady rise in public libraries
throughout the Oconee County providing an unexpected service to its visitors: online
media streaming. That’s right: thanks to the More Viewers, More Readers Initiative you
can go to one of the following libraries (link removed) and check out a registered device
that will allow you to watch your favorite shows and movies from home. One librarian
from Seneca said the following in a Facebook post:
“Friends and family! I have an exciting announcement to make! Have you ever
wanted to use Netflix or Hulu Premium but could never justify the cost? Don’t worry,
because now you can for absolutely free! All you have to do is find out if your local
library is participating in the More Viewers, More Readers Initiative! Once you’ve found
your library, just walk right in and ask about the program. Right now, we have a limited
number of devices (like special ChromeCasts or Firesticks (sic)) that are registered under
our name that we can give you access to. While the number of devices is limited, we have
a special system implemented so that there are always devices in rotation. Our thinking is
that if we can get more people to physically walk in to the library, even for something
like free Netflix, then they will be more inclined to make use of our other services (free
computer usage, movie rentals—yep, that’s right--, local resources, and of course the
books!!).
Libraries are a valuable community resource and its mere presence is enriching to
any community. So please, come visit us! Bring your friends, your family, and definitely
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your children if you have them! We always have all sorts of things for everyone to do.
Libraries are lots of fun, so please, let us show you how to have fun at your library. Let’s
make it somewhere special together!”
The popularity of this initiative has started to gain traction in local communities,
showing a 20% increase in visitors per day. Other counties have begun talks of
implementing this initiative as well to increase library participation.
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Appendix H
Fake News Vignette (No-threat condition): Libraries (Image)
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Appendix I

Syllogistic Reasoning Task

This is a analytic reasoning skills test, which presents you with an argument and asks you
to decide whether the conclusion is logically valid or invalid. You will note that each
argument has three parts: two statements and a conclusion. The idea is to accept the
statements and then decide if the conclusion follows logically. The logical validity of the
conclusion does not depend on whether the statements or conclusion are true. Examples:

All cats are dogs
No dogs are lions Therefore, no lions are cats
(valid, even though conclusion is false)

All fruit are apples.
All kiwi are fruit.
Therefore, no kiwi are apples.
(not valid, even though conclusion is true)

1. All codes are highly complex.
No quipu are highly complex.
Therefore, some quipu are not codes.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____
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2. All handicapped are capable.
All amputees are handicapped.
Therefore, some amputees are not capable.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____

3. All flying birds have feathers.
No people have feathers.
Therefore, some people are flying birds.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____

4. No decent girls are bad news.
All lesbians are bad news.
Therefore, no lesbians are decent girls.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____

5. No harmful substance is natural.
All poisons are natural.
Therefore, no poisons are harmful.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____
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6. No fruits are fungi.
All mushrooms are fungi.
Therefore, some mushrooms are fruits.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____

7. No isomorphs are cyclically bound.
All radix are cyclically bound.
Therefore, some isomorphs are radix.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____

8. All calculators are machines.
All computers are calculators.
Therefore, some machines are not computers.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____

9. All murderous people are criminals.
All Nazis were murderous.
Therefore, some Nazis are criminals.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____
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10. All real functors are mad.
All fluxion are real functors.
Therefore, some mad things are fluxion.

Valid: _____ Invalid: _____

Answers: VIIVVIIIVV
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